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Abstract
This paper examines the differences in total factor productivity (TFP)
between multinationals and domestic firms before and after tax rate changes
to investigate whether the host country corporate tax rate has a significant
influence on the measured TFP advantage of multinational companies. Using
a sample of approximately 16,000 European firms (1998-2004), we find that
a 10 percentage points cut in the statutory corporate tax rate would increase
multinationals’ measured TFP by about 10 per cent relative to domestic firms,
consistent with profit-shifting by multinationals. At the sample mean, this
would imply a 44 per cent increase in the TFP advantage of multinationals.
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1 Introduction
The divergence in productivity between multinationals and other companies is now
well-documented in both developed and developing economies (Lipsey (2002)). Multi-
national enterprises are not only more productive than purely domestic firms are,
they also seem to be the major forces driving the international performance of Eu-
ropean countries (Mayer and Ottaviano (2008)). But is the performance of these
stars measured correctly?
In recent years, researchers have provided evidence that multinationals (MNCs)
manipulate transfer prices and hence the value of sales and the costs of inputs to
minimise their overall tax burden (Devereux (2007)). We argue that manipulation of
transfer prices affects the measured productivity of MNCs. As there is intra-group
trade and transfer-pricing manipulation is not prohibitively costly, measured produc-
tivity for international companies will be over-reported in low-tax countries, as sales
will be over-recorded and the costs of intermediate inputs will be under-recorded.
Hence, the productivity advantage of multinationals with respect to domestic enti-
ties will be overestimated in low-tax jurisdictions, and vice versa. We find that a 10
percentage points cut in the statutory corporate tax rate would induce affiliates of
multinationals to increase their measured total factor productivity (TFP) by about
1
10 per cent relative to domestic firms. At the sample mean, the TFP advantage of
international companies would increase by about 44 per cent.
There is increasing evidence that international companies engage in either over-
or under-pricing of components shipped among various affiliates (Clausing (2003)
and Bernard et al. (2006)). Despite a variety of contributions on the performance
of MNCs, the effect of transfer-pricing manipulation on their reported productivity
has not been studied so far. Our study fills this gap. It bridges two streams of liter-
ature, the research on productivity heterogeneity across firms and the investigation
of profit-shifting. The novel aspect of our analysis is that we investigate changes
in the measured TFP advantage of multinationals with respect to domestic firms
following changes in the corporate tax rate. After a tax cut, multinationals have
less incentive to shift profits abroad, while domestic enterprises should not change
their behaviour, ceteris paribus. A direct comparison between multinational and do-
mestic companies has not been used previously in the profit-shifting literature. We
complement it with the use of company fixed effects to control for unobserved firm-
level characteristics which might affect the productivity premium of international
firms. The literature on the performance of MNCs rarely controls for unobserved
firm effects as this would wipe out the multinational indicator which is mostly time-
invariant in short panels.
Using ORBIS unconsolidated accounting data from 1998 to 2004, we find that
the statutory corporate tax rate has a negative impact on the measured TFP of
multinationals relative to domestic companies. The advantage of ORBIS is twofold.
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Companies can be classified as either multinational or domestic. Additionally, OR-
BIS allows us to compare entities and hence corporate tax rates across countries.
This is unusual in the productivity literature where most of the contributions are
country studies and the effects of taxes have been neglected.1 Our sample consists
of about 16,000 companies located in the European countries: Belgium, the Czech
Republic, Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the
most relevant literature on productivity of multinational companies and on profit-
shifting. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the results and a number
of extensions designed to show the robustness of our results. Section 5 concludes.
A detailed description of the dataset construction is presented in the Appendix.
2 Related literature
2.1 Productivity of multinational companies
Heterogeneity in firms’ productivity has been the subject of many studies encom-
passing developed, developing, and transitional economies.2 Affiliates of multina-
tionals are usually found to be superior to domestic companies in terms of both
labour and total factor productivity. Estimates of the TFP advantage of MNCs
1In a single country short panel, there might not be enough time-series variation in the tax rate
to identify any effect.
2For reviews of the earlier literature, see Lipsey (2002) and Bartelsman and Doms (2000).
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with respect to domestic firms range from 2.3 per cent to 15.5 per cent.3
Doms and Jensen (1998) is one of the earliest studies addressing productivity
heterogeneity using longitudinal micro-level data. They focus on the US manu-
facturing sector and show that foreign-owned establishments have between 2.3 per
cent and 3.7 per cent higher TFP than their purely domestic counterparts, even
after controlling for observable characteristics such as size, age, state and industry.
For the United Kingdom, Criscuolo and Martin (2009) analyse the TFP of 19,000
British manufacturing establishments between 1996 and 2000 using the Annual Re-
spondent Database (ARD). They estimate that the establishments owned by MNCs
are around 4.7 per cent more productive than purely domestic ones. Addition-
ally, US-owned entities display the highest performance (4.4 per cent higher TFP
than non-US MNCs). For Germany, Arnold and Hussinger (2005) find that the TFP
distribution of multinationals stochastically dominates that of domestic companies.4
An important concern with these studies is the potential endogeneity of multina-
tional status, if company-specific unobservable characteristics affect the probability
of a particular unit of observation being owned by a multinational company. The
literature has discussed many reasons why this could occur. For example, Criscuolo
and Martin (2009) find that MNCs systematically take over more productive entities
in the United Kingdom. In this chapter, we focus on changes in the TFP advantage
3Castellani and Zanfei (2007) find that subsidiaries of multinationals located in Italy are 15.5 per
cent more productive in terms of TFP than are domestic Italian companies. Their data correspond
to the 1996 Italian subset of ORBIS.
4The authors use the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) and the Bundesbank’s Microdatabase
on Direct Investment (MiDi).
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of multinationals following changes in the corporate tax rate. Unlike previous stud-
ies concerned with the level of TFP advantage, we can simply use subsidiary fixed
effects to address the endogeneity of multinational status.5
2.2 Evidence on profit-shifting
Multinational groups can shift income among affiliates resident in different coun-
tries in two main ways. First, they can alter the financing structure of the affiliates.
Multinational groups have an incentive to finance affiliates in high-tax countries
with debt, which may be provided by other affiliates in lower-taxed countries, be-
cause debt interest payments are deductible from the tax base. The second channel,
which is the main focus of this chapter, is through transfer pricing. If subsidiaries
within the same group trade with each other, then there is an incentive for the
subsidiary in the higher-taxed country to underprice the goods that it sells to the
subsidiary in the lower-taxed country, and to overprice the goods that it purchases
from the subsidiary in the lower taxed country. Goods may include material inputs,
intermediate products, or intangible goods such as royalties. The reverse is true for
the subsidiary in the low-tax country.
The literature has found both direct and indirect evidence of the latter channel
at the firm level. Clausing (2003) uses the Bureau of Labour Statistics data on US
international trade export and import prices. The data allow one to distinguish
5While investigating productivity spillovers from MNCs to domestic companies in Venezuela,
Aitken and Harrison (1999) are able to control for company fixed effects. Their ownership indicator
changes over time. The same is true for Fukao et al. (2006) and Girma and Go¨rg (2007), who
investigate TFP growth in establishments acquired by foreign companies in Japan and in the
United Kingdom, respectively.
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between intrafirm trade and ‘arm’s length’ trade. She finds that a 1 per cent lower
statutory tax rate in the foreign country is associated with 0.8 per cent lower in-
trafirm export prices to, and 0.8 per cent higher intrafirm import prices from, the
foreign country. In addition, Bernard et al. (2006) use the Linked/Longitudinal Firm
Trade Transactions Database which links individual trade transactions to firms in
the United States between 1993–2000. The data record whether the transactions
take place at ‘arm’s length’ or between ‘related parties’. The authors create for
each related party price, the price wedge which is equal to the difference between
the log of a representative ‘arm’s-length’ trade price minus the log of the ‘related
party price’. They find that a one percentage point decrease in the host country
(average effective) tax rate is associated with an increase of 0.55 to 0.66 points in
the price wedge. Other literature that finds evidence of transfer pricing includes
Swenson (2001) and Overesch (2006).
Two recent contributions find indirect evidence of transfer pricing manipulation
using European data. Weichenrieder (2009) finds indirect evidence of transfer price
manipulation analysing German inbound FDI. He finds that an increase in the
home country’s tax rate of 10 percentage points increases the return on assets for
the German subsidiary by half a percentage point, which is roughly a 10 per cent
increase. Huizinga and Laeven (2008) use the AMADEUS dataset, the European
sub-sample of the ORBIS dataset. Their sample consists of subsidiaries located
in Europe that belong to multinational groups whose parents are also located in
Europe, and their parent companies. They find that European multinationals’ semi-
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elasticity of reported profits with respect to the top statutory corporate tax rate is
-1.3, while profit-shifting costs are estimated to be 0.6 per cent of the tax base.
3 Data
The sample is drawn from ORBIS, a database recording balance sheet and profit
and loss account items for companies all over the world. The dataset is created
by Bureau van Dijk (2007) and is based on the mandatory information from filed
and publicly available accounts. The ORBIS unit of observation is an individual
company, which may be a subsidiary of a larger group.
The comparison between the behaviour of MNCs and domestic firms when the
corporate tax rate changes will be the source of our identification strategy: the
total factor productivity advantage of multinationals relative to domestic firms is
expected to increase after a tax cut.
To implement this comparison, firms must be classified as either multinational
or domestic. This can be done in ORBIS, as it provides information on the share-
holders and subsidiaries of the company, on shareholders’ type (that is, individual
or corporate) and country of residence. We classify firms as multinationals if they
are owned by a corporate shareholder (with more than 50 per cent of their capital)
either resident abroad or owning subsidiaries in at least one other foreign country.
The rest of the companies for which adequate ownership information is provided
are classified as domestic. For a more detailed description of how we derive the
ownership structure of each firm, see Appendix 5.
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We restrict our analysis to companies that are classified to the manufacturing
sector to reduce conceptual and empirical problems in measuring productivity in the
non-manufacturing sectors.6 We eliminate very large multinationals and very small
domestic companies in terms of total assets to obtain a sample of more comparable
entities in both groups. We keep only companies with at least three consecutive
years of observations between 1998 and 2004.7
The sample consists of 16,022 firms (85,606 observations) over the period 1998–2004.
The geographical distribution of these companies is given in Table 1, where firms are
divided between multinational and domestic entities. In Belgium, Finland, France,
and United Kingdom the proportion of MNCs is not far from that of domestic firms.
In Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain, and Sweden domestic companies represent nearly,
or more than, two-thirds of all companies, depending on the country. The Czech
Republic is an exception: about 67 per cent of the sample belongs to a multinational
group.8
The literature suggests that companies owned by MNCs are systematically bigger
than their domestic counterparts (Flanagan (2006)). Our sample is no exception. In
every country, firms affiliated to an international group display on average a larger
6Each country uses a specific industrial classification system for cataloguing the industries of the
companies filing accounts with the official registries. All company accounts filed in a given country,
therefore, indicate the company’s sector of activity with this national code. ORBIS matches this
code with the NACE code (Rev 1.1) for each firm. For the manufacturing sector, the NACE code
ranges between 15.00 and 40.00. For more information, see Appendix 5.
7See Appendix 5 for a more in depth analysis of how we created the sample.
8The results remain robust to the exclusion of the Czech Republic from the sample (see section
4.3).
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size in terms of value added, fixed assets, and number of employees (see Table 2).9
In this analysis, changes in the statutory corporate tax rate identify the effect of
profit-shifting by MNCs on their measured total factor productivity. As depicted in
Table 3, the variations are mainly cuts. Belgium reduced its rate from 40 per cent
to 34 per cent in 2003. More gradual cuts happened in the Czech Republic where
the rate was decreased from 35 per cent in 1998 to 28 per cent in 2004, in France
where the tax rate was reduced from 42 per cent to 34 per cent between 1998 and
2002, in Poland were the rate was lowered gradually by 17 percentage points and in
Italy where the tax rate dropped in stages from 41.2 per cent to 37 per cent within
the period 2000–2004. Smaller changes happened in Finland, United Kingdom, and
Spain.
4 Empirical model and main results
The purpose of this study is to look at how the measured TFP of multinational com-
panies is affected by transfer-pricing manipulation and hence by the host country’s
corporate tax rate. Total factor productivity can be affected by other country-
specific factors for which one can control only partially. We consider a change in the
statutory corporate tax rate. Multinationals can react to a change in the statutory
corporate tax rate by increasing or decreasing the extent to which they shift profits
abroad. Domestic firms do not have this opportunity. They cannot engage in the
9The Czech Republic and Poland are exceptions when size is measured by the number of
employees. Domestic companies in these transitional economies might still have a large labour
force which is relatively unproductive, as suggested in Table 4. For robustness checks excluding
the Czech Republic and Poland, see Section 4.3.
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manipulation of transfer prices but, at the same time, they are affected by all the
other host-country- specific factors (for example, infrastructure, regulations), which
also affect the resident multinationals.
In our sample, tax rate changes occur at different points in time and in different
countries. Additionally, some of the tax cuts did not happen in one year, but rather
gradually over a longer period. In this study, we identify the effect of transfer
pricing manipulation on multinationals’ TFP using a dummy variable indicating
multinational status interacted with the corporate tax rate of the host country.
This approach has not been implemented previously in the profit-shifting literature.
It is a robust method as, through the inclusion of domestic firms, it controls for
unobserved factors affecting multinational and domestic companies at the same
time. We further control for firm-level fixed effects which are likely to be correlated
with MNC status.
4.1 TFP measurement
We consider a conventional Cobb-Douglas production function of the form:
Yi,t = Ai,tK
αK
i,t L
αL
i,t (1)
where i indexes a firm, and t a year. Yi,t is value added. Our main measure of value
added is constructed as reported earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) plus
reported costs of employees. In our robustness checks we also consider sales minus
costs of materials as an alternative measure of value added.10 Ki,t is capital stock.
10The UK companies do not report costs of materials. Hence, we drop them when using this
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In our main specification, we measure capital as the book value of fixed assets, but
we also consider the book value of tangible fixed assets as an alternative measure.
Li,t is the number of employees.
Taking logarithms of equation (1) and rearranging,
ln(Ai,t) = ln(Yi,t)− αK ln(Ki,t)− αLln(Li,t) (2)
Measurement of log TFP (that is, ln(Ai,t)) requires estimates of the parameters
αK and αL. The literature reports two main ways of obtaining these estimates.
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The factor share approach calculates the parameters from cost share data for each
firm.12 Assuming that the firm maximises profits, the first order conditions for op-
timal input choices imply that αK =
rK
Y
and αL =
wL
Y
, where r is the cost of capital
and w is the wage. Under the assumption of constant returns to scale, we also have
αK = 1− αL = 1− wLY , so that this approach only requires data on wage bills and
value added, both of which are available in ORBIS.
The production function approach estimates these parameters from a regression
of log value added on log capital and log labour, and hence estimates log TFP as
the residual of this estimated production function.13
The main results that we present in Section 4.2 are based on a version of the
second measure of value added.
11See Van Biesebroeck (2008) for a review of the advantages and disadvantages of each method.
12See Caves et al. (1982).
13See for example Griliches and Mairesse (1998) and Klette (1999).
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cost share approach, but we also present results for estimated production functions
in Section 4.3 as a robustness check.
Imposing constant returns to scale in (2), we then obtain our main measure of
log TFP as:
ln(Ai,t) = ln(
Yi,t
Li,t
)− αK ln(Ki,t
Li,t
) (3)
The parameter αK is measured separately for each country-industry pair, as the
mean value of one minus the share of labour costs in value added for firms in that
country and industry.14
Table 4 shows that the unconditional mean TFP and labour productivity of
multinationals are significantly higher than those of domestic firms in all countries.15
A mean-comparison t-test reveals that the MNCs’ advantage relative to domestic
companies in both total factor and labour productivity is significant at the 1 per cent
level for all countries, except for Sweden where the difference in labour productivity
is significant at the 5 per cent level.
14 Industry here is defined as a sub-sector of manufacturing industry. We have defined three
sub-sectors on the basis of the NACE code (Rev 1.1). For more details, see Appendix 5. The
values of αK range from 0.13 to 0.37 with an overall mean of 0.21. In column (4) of Table 21,
we also run the regression with αK which is calculated at the country-industry level but differs
between multinational and domestic companies. The resulting estimates do not change.
15As we would expect, the difference between TFP of multinational and domestic companies is
higher in Table 4 than reported in the previous literature (see Section 2.1). This is because the
literature conditions on other factors which we believe are not correlated with the tax factor (for
example, R&D).
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4.2 Main results
We estimate a regression model to assess how changes in the statutory corporate tax
rate affect the measured TFP of companies owned by multinational groups relative
to those of domestic companies:
ln(Ai,t) = β1(multii ∗ τc,t) + β2(Cc ∗ Tt) + fi + εi,t (4)
where c indexes a country, multii is a time-invariant dummy variable indicating
that a firm belongs to a multinational group, and τc,t is the statutory corporate
tax rate in the home country in year t; (Cc ∗ Tt) are country-year dummy variables
which control inter alia for different inflation rates in different countries;16 fi is an
unobserved time-invariant company-specific effect which might be correlated with
multinational status; εi,t is an idiosyncratic shock.
We allow the extent to which the productivity of MNCs differs from that of
domestic enterprises to vary with the host country corporate income tax rate. As
discussed earlier, we expect the productivity advantage of multinationals to increase
following a reduction in the host country tax rate. This would be consistent with a
negative value of the parameter β1.
17
16This is a simpler alternative to deflating nominal values country by country. Country-year
dummies also control for country-specific macro effects.
17This assumes that other relevant countries do not cut their corporate tax rate at the same
time. The incentive for MNCs to transfer profits out of a country also depends on tax rates in
the rest of the world. Huizinga and Laeven (2008) construct a weighted average of tax rates for
all countries where an individual multinational has affiliates. We do not follow this approach here
because our sample only has partial coverage of multinational groups (see data Appendix). Table 3
confirms that corporate tax rate changes were not synchronised across countries during our sample
period.
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We estimate equation (4) with a standard within-group estimator.18 This allows
us to control for unobserved firm-level fixed effects. The results are presented in
column (1) of Table 5. The coefficient on the interaction term between the MNC
dummy and the corporate tax rate is negative and highly significant. It implies that
a 10 percentage points increase in the host country tax rate decreases the measured
TFP of multinationals by about 10 per cent relative to domestic firms. This is
approximately the difference between the corporate tax rate in Italy (37.4 per cent)
and Sweden (28 per cent) in 2004. At the sample mean,19 the result implies that
the TFP advantage of multinationals would increase by about 44 per cent.20
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
The results presented so far are based on a TFP measure where value added is calcu-
lated as EBIT plus cost of employees, and the capital stock is measured by the book
value of fixed assets. We first test whether our findings hold when we employ other
measures of value added and capital. Column (2) of Table 5 reports results using
value added calculated as sales minus costs of materials. Here the sample drops
to 52,692 observations because UK firms do not report costs of materials. Column
18Standard errors are clustered at the company level to allow for serial correlation within the
firm. We also clustered at the country, country-sector, and country-global owner levels to allow for
common country, country-sector, and country-global owner shocks. Coefficients remain significant
at 1 per cent.
19See the last row of Table 4.
20At the sample mean, the initial TFP gap between multinational and domestic companies is
seven (see last row of Table 4). After a 10 percentage points cut in the corporate tax rate, the total
factor productivity of MNCs will increase by 10 per cent (see the coefficient estimate of column (1)
of Table 4) to 34.1. The gap between the TFP of multinationals and domestic firms will increase
to 10.1. This is an increase of about 44 per cent with respect to the initial gap.
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(3) shows results where the capital stock is measured as the book value of tangible
fixed assets. In both columns, the coefficient on the interaction term between the
MNC dummy variable and the corporate tax rate remains negative, significant, and
very close in magnitude to the main specification of column (1). So far we have
presented results for an unbalanced panel of firms. Column (4) of Table 5 shows
that the coefficient on the interaction of the MNC dummy variable and the tax rate
remains negative and significant in a balanced panel where all firms have all seven
years of data.21
As a further robustness check, we restrict the analysis to a sub-sample of coun-
tries which have implemented substantial cuts in their corporate tax rate (that is,
France, Italy, Belgium, the Czech Republic and Poland). Column (1) of Table 6
shows that in this sub-sample, the coefficient on the variable of interest stays neg-
ative, significant, and very close in magnitude to the main specification of Table 5.
A 10 percentage points increase in the corporate tax rate would reduce the TFP
of multinationals relative to domestic firms by about 11 per cent. Columns (2) to
(6) estimate equation (4) on separate sub-samples for these individual countries.
The estimated coefficients remain negative and significant (except for Belgium), al-
though with differing magnitudes. This is not particularly surprising as many other
country-specific tax provisions (for example, CFC rules) and firm-specific factors
(for example, location of affiliates) may affect the degree to which MNCs can en-
gage in profit-shifting.
21In this sample all firms from the Czech Republic are necessarily dropped, as we do not have
Czech data for all seven years.
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One feature we notice is that the estimated coefficient is consistently larger for
the two transitional economies. Column (7) of Table 6 tests the robustness of our re-
sults to the exclusion of the Czech Republic and Poland. The key coefficient remains
negative and significant although smaller in magnitude: a 10 percentage points cut
in the corporate tax rate would here reduce the TFP of multinational companies by
about 6 per cent.
Subsidiaries of multinational companies are known to be larger than the average
domestic firm (Lipsey (2002)). In column (1) of Table 7, we rule out that the effect
picked up by the multinational dummy is in fact a size effect. Whilst the negative
impact of the tax rate for multinational companies remains strong and highly sig-
nificant, it shows that the size effect is insignificant.22 In the same table, we allow
for domestic and multinational companies to be different across the economic cycle.
Column (2) shows that the tax rate does not proxy the economic cycle.23 Also,
real productivity of multinational companies could respond differently to tax rate
cuts. For example, multinationals might be quicker in increasing their productivity
because they can adjust their investment decisions faster. Devereux and Griffith
(2003) explain that conditional on the discrete investment choice (that is, where to
locate), marginal investment decisions (that is, the size of investment) depend on
the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR). The latter is a measure of the effect of
22The size dummy takes value one when the log(total assets) is bigger than the sample median
log(total assets) for at least four years. It is a time-invariant variable. The model in column (1) is
also tested with a time-variant size dummy. The estimates do not change.
23To control for the economic cycle, we employ the World Bank Development Indicators on
inflation, GDP growth, and unemployment rates.
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taxes on the cost of capital. It accounts not only for the statutory corporate tax
rate, but also for capital depreciation allowances and different forms of financing. In
column (3) of Table 7 we allow for the effect of the EMTR24 to be different between
multinational and domestic entities. The coefficient on the variable of interest stays
negative and not statistically different from one, but it increases in magnitude with
respect to the benchmark specification of Table 5 where we do not control for the
EMTR. Column (4) allows for a different αK between multinational and domestic
companies. The key coefficient remains negative and even if lower, its magnitude is
not significantly different from the estimate of the benchmark specification of Table
5.
If after a tax cut multinational companies systematically buy highly productive
domestic entities, our estimates will be upward biased. To control for this effect,
we identify companies involved in operations of mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
during the sample period using a dataset called ZEPHYR.25 Unfortunately, because
of a lack of information, we are not always able to identify whether a company has
changed its ownership status after an M&A deal. Therefore, in column (5) of Table
7 we drop all companies involved in some sort of M&A operations between 1998
and 2004. Our results remain strongly robust to the exclusion of firms which have
potentially changed their ownership status in response to a change in the corporate
tax rate.
24For more details on how the EMTR is built, see (Devereux and Griffith (2003)). Effective
marginal tax rates are taken from Devereux et al. (2008).
25ZEPHYR is also compiled by Bureau van Dijk as ORBIS. It is therefore possible to merge the
two datasets and identify some but not all ownership changes occurred during the sample period.
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In Table 8, we show that our results are not sensitive to the use of the factor
share approach to measure TFP. As an alternative, we combine equations (3) and
(4) and estimate an extended production function of the form
ln(
Yi,t
Li,t
) = αK ln(
Ki,t
Li,t
) + (5)
+β1(multii ∗ τc,t) + β2(Cc ∗ Tt) + fi + εi,t
In column (1) of Table 8, we report within-group estimates of equation (5). The
coefficient of the key interaction term remains negative, highly significant, and very
close in magnitude to the results of Table 5. The estimated value of αK is some-
what lower than suggested by the cost share data (see Footnote 14). The production
function approach allows us to relax the constant returns to scale (CRS) assumption
easily by adding the term α1ln(Ki,t) on the right-hand side of equation (5). The
results shown in column (2) of Table 8 confirm that our main findings hold when we
do not impose CRS: a 10 percentage points cut in the tax rate would induce MNCs
to increase their measured TFP by about 9 per cent.
In summary, tables 6 to 8 indicate that the effect of changes in the tax rate on
the TFP gap between multinational and domestic companies is robust to various
sensitivity checks.
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5 Conclusions
We find evidence consistent with multinational companies shifting revenues into
low-tax countries and shifting input costs into high-tax jurisdictions. This has im-
plications for measured TFP. In particular, if MNCs engage in transfer-price ma-
nipulation, the difference in TFP between multinationals and domestic companies
will tend to be underestimated in high-tax countries and overestimated in low-tax
countries.
We estimate that a 10 percentage points increase in the host country tax rate
decreases the measured TFP of multinationals by about 10 per cent relative to
domestic firms. At the sample mean, this implies a 44 per cent increase in the
TFP advantage of multinationals. This has potentially important implications when
comparing measured TFP differences across countries with high and low corporate
tax rates. If a high-tax country such as Italy were to reduce its statutory corporate
tax rate (37.4 per cent) to the level of Sweden (28 per cent), multinational companies
located in Italy would increase their measured TFP relative to domestic companies
by about 10 per cent.
19
Appendix B
In this appendix, we describe the construction of the dataset used in the empirical
analysis. The starting point is the ORBIS database provided by Bureau van Dijk
(2007) (2007 CD version) which records data for nine million companies around
the world. The database includes information for each company on the country of
residence, the industry, and the accounting date. It also provides broad information
on balance sheet and profit and loss (P&L) account items.
We calculate value added per employee as either EBIT (427)26 plus costs of
employees (435), or as sales (426) minus costs of materials (434). We proxy the
capital stock with either fixed assets (404), or tangible fixed assets (406) and we
use data on the number of employees (425).
The database also provides information on the firms’ ownership structure. This
includes information on direct owners (including their shareholdings in the com-
pany), on the ultimate or ‘global’ owner (including its relevant direct and total
capital ownership share), on companies’ subsidiaries, if any, and the corresponding
percentages of ownership. Only the most recently reported ownership information
(usually for 2004) is recorded.
We exclude micro firms as defined by European Commission (2003) by including
only companies with total assets (412) exceeding 2 million Euros for two consecutive
years since 2001. This yields a starting sample of 931,324 firms from 1993 to 2005.
26The ORBIS reference number for each item is in parentheses in bold.
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Below, we describe how we derived the final sample from this initial dataset (see
Table 9). We first illustrate how we use the ownership information. We then explain
the treatment of financial data.
Ownership information
We classify companies in our sample as either being part of a multinational group or
as domestic entities. The latter are either stand-alone companies with no affiliates
or they belong to a domestic group which has neither affiliates nor corporate global
owners abroad. Firms are classified as being part of a multinational group if their
ultimate owner (as reported in ORBIS) is a corporation and it is resident abroad, or
if other corporate affiliates in the group are resident in a different jurisdiction. We
allocate companies to their global owner (GO) directly if this information is provided
by ORBIS. If this is not possible, we create a chain of ownership employing the data
on the direct owners (DOs). The latter are classified according to their type: individ-
ual or corporate owners where the latter group includes banks, financial, industrial,
and insurance companies. If these DOs are not found in the sample,27 the ownership
chain is interrupted and a global owner cannot be identified. In this case, we exclude
the firm from the sample. If DOs are available, we first check their shareholding. If
none of them holds more than 50 per cent of the firm’s capital and the firm does not
itself own subsidiaries abroad, then the company is classified as domestic. The same
happens if the main DO is an individual, irrespective of whether they have the ma-
jority of the firm’s capital. If the DO is found in our starting sample and it is both
27To be identified by our procedure, direct owners have to be within the initial sample of 931,324
companies.
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a corporation and independent,28 then it is defined as the global owner. If it is not
independent, then its DO (that is, second level owner) is identified and the process
continues until no other corporate DO with more than 50 per cent shareholding can
be identified. If the DO with a majority shareholding in the firm is a fund or an
individual, then the last corporate DO in the chain is designated as the global owner.
Financial data
From the initial sample of 931,324 firms, we remove companies for which only consol-
idated accounts are reported. This avoids duplication and allows us to distinguish
among different affiliates. We then drop observations with number of employees,
EBIT, cost of employees, or fixed assets either missing or equal to zero. We also
eliminate observations with a negative value for the sum of EBIT plus cost of em-
ployees. Observations with accounting closing dates from July of year x until June
of year x+ 1 are assigned to calendar year x. To ensure that the accounting period
between two subsequent calendar years is close to twelve months, we drop observa-
tions that are less than 11 months or more than 13 months distant from the end of
the previous accounting period. In the next step, we remove observations with clear
mistakes. We sum the P&L account and the balance sheet sub-items (for example,
current assets and fixed assets) which should add up to a core item (for example,
total assets). Observations are dropped if the sum of these sub-items amounts to
less than 95 per cent or more than 101 per cent of the corresponding core item. In
28A company is defined as independent if it does not have any corporate shareholders owning
more than 50 per cent of its capital.
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addition, we eliminate observations with negative total assets, negative total liabil-
ities (423), or interest payments (437).
At this stage, we merge the financial data with the ownership data. We only
keep companies which we are able to classify as either domestic or multinational enti-
ties. Among MNCs, we keep only firms whose global owner is an industrial company.
To work with comparable production functions and to avoid problems in the
definition of TFP, we focus only on the manufacturing sector by keeping firms with
NACE code (Rev 1.1) between 15.00 and 40.00.29 The coverage for some countries is
quite poor before 1998 and in 2005. Hence, we only retain observations between 1998
and 2004, inclusive. Subsequently, we drop countries with very few firms (that is,
less than 15 domestic or multinational companies). To make the domestic companies
more comparable to the multinational companies, we eliminate very small entities in
the first group and very large firms in the second one. Specifically, we drop domestic
companies whose size in terms of total assets is smaller than the 5th percentile of
the multinationals’ size30 distribution. We also drop multinational companies with
total assets greater than the 95th percentile of the domestics’ size distribution. We
also drop outliers in the financial data. We define outliers with respect to two ratios:
(i) fixed assets over employees and (ii) cost of employees over the sum of EBIT and
wage bill (that is, value added). Every observation that falls in the top or bottom
29To calculate TFP as in equation (3), we have divided the sample into three manufacturing
sub-sectors. The first one includes companies with a NACE code (Rev. 1.1) between 15.00 and
20.00. The second group contains companies with NACE code between 20.00 and 30.00. The rest
of the firms are grouped in the third sector (that is, NACE code between 30.00 and 40.00).
30Here size is measured as total assets.
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1 per cent of those two ratios is dropped. Finally, we keep only firms with no
missing values for EBIT and costs of employees for three consecutive years between
1998–2004 to limit the confounding effect of entry and exit from the sample. This
reduces the number of countries. Some of them have less than 15 domestic firms or
15 multinationals in each year. These countries are dropped. As shown in Table 9,
the final sample contains 16,022 firms for a total of 85,606 observations.
Time-varying ownership dummy
During the sample period, some companies might have changed their ownership
status from domestic to multinational or vice versa. More specifically, multina-
tional companies might have taken over highly productive domestic companies after
a cut in the corporate tax rate. In this case, the multinational dummy would be
endogenous. As mentioned above, ORBIS does not contain time-varying owner-
ship information. To track changes in the ownership dummy we use a dataset called
ZEPHYR. It records M&A operations involving some of the companies in our regres-
sion sample as targets, acquirers, or vendors. ZEPHYR is also compiled by Bureau
van Dijk as ORBIS and it is therefore possible to merge the two datasets with the
potential to create changes in the multinational dummy. Unfortunately, ZEPHYR
does not always contain enough information to know with certainty whether a firm
has really changed its status from domestic to multinational or vice versa. In the
robustness checks of Table (7), we then decided to drop companies involved in a
M&A deal during the sample period.31
31Table (14) describes the country distribution of these observations.
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The Construction of Ownership Changes Using ZEPHYR
In a M&A deal, a company can act as a target, an acquirer, or a vendor. To encom-
pass all possible cases, we downloaded three different datasets from ZEPHYR. The
first includes deals for which targets are located in Belgium, the Czech Republic,
Finland, France, United Kingdom, Norway, Poland, Spain, and Sweden (as in our
regression sample), the second includes acquirers, and the third includes vendors
located in the same countries.
All possible changes in ownership are summarised in tables (10) to (12). For our
analysis, the cells on the south-west to north-east diagonals are the most interesting,
as they record changes in the multinational dummy.
The number of deals reported in ZEPHYR increases substantially from 2002
onwards. In previous years, the coverage is less effective. This is reflected in Table
(13) which shows a breakdown by years of the number of deals affecting companies
in our sample. About 40 per cent of the M&A operations take place in the United
Kingdom. Belgium, France, Spain and Sweden represent each about 10 per cent of
the deals (see Table (14)).
Initially we downloaded deals between 1998 and 2004 in which targets are lo-
cated in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Norway,
Poland, Spain, and Sweden. For a description of the dataset, see Table (15).
We use the information in this dataset to establish which companies in our regres-
sion sample have been part of a deal and, as a consequence, have changed their
ownership status from domestic to multinational or vice versa. If a company in
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ORBIS is also present in ZEPHYR as a target, it is possible to trace changes in its
ownership in the way shown in Diagrams 1 and 2 below.
To identify the status of the target before the deal32, we first need to know the
country of the vendor. Unfortunately, in the targets dataset about 50 per cent of
the deals (129 out of 256 deals) do not report any information on the vendor. This
means that the id number, the country, the name, and the parent of the vendor
are missing. For these observations, it is impossible to identify what the ownership
status of the target was before the deal.
If the country of the vendor is available and it is different from the country of the
target, the latter can be classified as part of a multinational group before the deal
(that is, Box 1 of Diagram 1). If the country of the target and the country of the
vendor are the same, we need information on the ownership structure of both the
vendor and the target, as shown in Diagram 1. Among the observations for which
the country of the vendor is available (121), about 70 per cent record a country of
the vendor which is the same as the country of the target. This could be interpreted
as evidence that the company was part of a domestic group before the deal33. How-
ever, the vendor might in fact be part of a multinational group itself and (or) the
target might have foreign subsidiaries. Since we do not have ownership information
for companies before 2004, we are unable to establish the ownership status of the
vendor and of the target. Consequently, we cannot distinguish between Box 2 and
Box 3 in Diagram 1.
32This means identifying from which cell of the second column of Table (10) the firm starts.
33Also, if the vendor is an individual, the company could have been a stand-alone.
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The ownership status of the target after an M&A operation could easily be approx-
imated with its ownership structure available in ORBIS for 2004 (see Diagram 2).
In summary, provided that the information on the country of the vendor is available,
we can identify some of the cases in the third row of Table (10) (that is, when the
target was a multinational entity before the deal). Unfortunately, without further
assumptions we are unable to identify the fourth row (that is, when the target was
a domestic entity before the deal). We cannot decide whether the firm was truly a
domestic entity (that is, decide between Box 2 and Box 3 in Diagram 1) when the
country of the vendor and the country of the target are the same.
We could make an assumption. When the target and the vendor are resident in
the same country, we could consider the former as being domestic before the deal
occurred (see Table (15)).
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Diagram 1. How to identify the ownership before a deal occurred
Country of target (T) 6= country of vendor (V)
YES
1. T was MNC
before deal
NO
Was V part of MNC group
(that is, did V have foreign
subsidiaries and (or) owners)?
OR
Did T have foreign subsidiaries?
Difficult to establish:
lack of information before 2004
YES
2. T MNC
before deal
NO
3. T DOMESTIC
before deal
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Diagram 2. How to identify the ownership after a deal occurred
Country of target (T) 6= country of acquirer (A)
YES
4. T is MNC
after deal
NO
Is T part of a
multinational group?
Possible to establish
using information in ORBIS (2004)
YES
5. T MNC
after deal
NO
6. T DOMESTIC
after deal
ZEPHYR-acquirers
The second dataset contains deals in which the acquirers are located in Belgium,
the Czech Republic, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Norway, Poland, Spain, and
Sweden. For a description of the dataset, see Table (16).
For the acquirers in ZEPHYR, it is hard to establish their ownership status before
the deal because there is no information on the ownership structure before 2004. We
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can only identify two cases. First, when the acquirer is classified as a domestic entity
in ORBIS in 2004, by acquiring the firm the same company could have only been
domestic before the deal. Second, when the acquirer is classified as multinational
in ORBIS and at the same time it acquires a company located in the same country,
it must have been multinational before the deal. For the acquirers classified as
multinationals in 2004, and buying a foreign subsidiary, it is not possible to identify
their ownership status before the M&A operation. They could have been domestic
and become multinational purely through the acquisition recorded in ZEPHYR34 or
they could have already been part of an international group. In terms of Table (11),
we are only able to identify some of the elements of the main diagonal. We could
make a strong assumption. We could assume that the foreign subsidiary acquired is
the only foreign subsidiary of the group. This would mean that the acquirer was a
domestic entity before the deal and that it has become a multinational entity only
because of the acquisition recorded in ZEPHYR.
ZEPHYR-Vendors
The third dataset contains vendors involved in M&A operations between 1998 and
2004 and located in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, United King-
dom, Norway, Poland, Spain, and Sweden. For a description of the dataset, see
Table (17).
If a company in ORBIS is also available in ZEPHYR as the vendor, we can easily
establish its multinational status before the deal when the country of the target is
different from the country of the vendor (see Box 7 of Diagram 3). In this case,
34This would in fact be the most interesting case for our analysis.
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the vendor was a multinational before the deal. After the deal, it can either remain
part of a multinational group or become a domestic entity if the sold subsidiary was
its only foreign subsidiary. We can distinguish between those two cases employing
the ORBIS ownership structure for 2004. Problems arise when the countries of the
vendor and of the target are the same. As shown in Diagram 3, we are unable to
distinguish between Box 8 and Box 9 as we do not have information on the own-
ership structure of the vendor and of the target before 2004. Even if the target is
located in the same country as the vendor, we cannot identify the latter as part of
a domestic entity before the deal. If the target had foreign subsidiaries, the vendor
would be part of a multinational group before the M&A operation.
In summary, when a company is involved in M&A operations as a vendor, we can
identify the third row of Table (12). We are able to identify some of the vendors
which were part of a multinational group before the deal35. Unfortunately, be-
cause of the lack of information before 2004, we are unable to identify multinational
companies which become domestic by selling domestic subsidiaries with foreign op-
erations.
As for the targets dataset, we could make an assumption. When the target and
the vendor are resident in the same country, we could consider the latter as being
domestic before the deal occurred (see Table (17)).
35This refers to the vendors which sell a foreign subsidiary, but not to the vendors which sell a
target located in their country but with foreign subsidiaries.
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Diagram 3. How to identify the ownership before a deal occurred
Country of target (T) 6= country of vendor (V)?
YES
7. V was MNC
before deal
NO
Were V or T part of
a multinational group?
Difficult to establish:
no information before 2004
YES
8. V was MNC
before deal
NO
9. V was DOMESTIC
before deal
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Merging ZEPHYR with ORBIS
We merge the three datasets downloaded from ZEPHYR with ORBIS in order to
create a changing ownership dummy. Tables (14) to (18) describe some of the
characteristics of the new dataset. Table (19) summarises all the changes in the
ownership structure that we are able to classify, including those identified through
the assumptions outlined in the paragraphs above and summarised below36:
1. TARGETS dataset. When the target and the vendor are resident in the same
country, we consider the former as being domestic before the deal occurred
(see Table (15)).
2. ACQUIRERS dataset. The foreign subsidiary acquired is the only foreign
subsidiary of what is classified in ORBIS as an international group in 2004.
This means that the acquirer was a domestic entity before the deal and that it
has become a multinational entity with the acquisition recorded in ZEPHYR
(see Table (16)).
3. VENDORS dataset. When the target and the vendor are resident in the
same country and the vendor is recorded as a domestic company in ORBIS,
we consider the latter as being domestic before the deal occurred (see Table
(17)).
36Overall the changes classified using the aforementioned assumption are 119, about 28 per cent
of the observations included reported in ZEPHYR and 0.14 per cent of the whole sample.
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Table 1: Ownership Structure
Country Domestic MNCs Total
Belgium 485 382 867
56 44
Czech Republic 40 81 121
33 67
Finland 112 117 229
49 51
France 1,434 1,381 2,815
51 49
Italy 1,575 514 2,089
75 25
Norway 361 131 492
73 27
Poland 209 141 350
60 40
Spain 2,272 558 2,830
80 20
Sweden 1,015 534 1,549
66 34
United Kingdom 2,666 2,014 4,680
57 43
Total 10,169 5,853 16,022
63 37
(i) Number of firms. (ii) Percentages in italics.
Table 2: Value Added, Fixed Assets, Number of Employees–Unconditional Means
Country Value added Fixed assets Number of employees
MNCs Domestics MNCs Domestics MNCs Domestics
Belgium 4,672 2,487 4,450 2,608 81 49
Czech Republic 3,636 3,009 6,388 4,417 197 270
Finland 6,374 4,205 4,734 4,227 107 86
France 5,029 3,413 3,430 2,041 95 72
Italy 3,857 2,862 3,064 3,426 78 61
Norway 4,686 3,188 3,790 2,643 70 55
Poland 3,353 2,823 5,663 4,060 205 227
Spain 4,206 2,156 4,597 3,017 80 50
Sweden 3,994 2,421 3,994 2,741 84 57
United Kingdom 4,642 3,904 3,770 2,944 98 99
Total 4,562 3,013 3,870 2,905 94 73
(i) Values for value added and fixed assets are in thousands of US$ 2000 prices.
(ii)Values for the number of employees are headcounts. Value added is calculated as earnings before
interest and taxes (EBIT) plus costs of employees.
34
Table 3: Statutory Corporate Tax Rates
Country Rates Years
(Per cent)
Belgium 40 1998–2002
34 2003–2004
Czech Republic 35 1998–1999
31 2000–2003
28 2004
Finland 28 1998–1999
29 2000–2004
France 41.7 1998
40 1999
36.7 2000
35.3 2001
34.3 2002–2004
Italy 41.2 1998–2000
40.3 2001–2002
38.2 2003
37.3 2004
Norway 28 1998-2004
Poland 36 1998
34 1999
30 2000
28 2001–2002
27 2003
19 2004
Spain 35 1998–2003
35.3 2004
Sweden 28 1998–2004
United Kingdom 31 1998
30 1999–2004
Sample Average 34.3
Table 4: TFP and Labour Productivity–Unconditional Means
Country TFP % Difference Labour productivity % Difference
MNCs Domestics MNCs Domestics
Belgium 38 32 18*** 65 56 16***
Czech Republic 8 6 33*** 36 18 100***
Finland 30 24 25*** 68 53 28***
France 37 34 9*** 63 56 12***
Italy 26 20 30*** 63 56 12***
Norway 45 35 29*** 83 65 28***
Poland 10 7 43*** 44 28 57***
Spain 25 18 39*** 64 50 28***
Sweden 21 18 17*** 54 49 10**
United Kingdom 33 26 27*** 56 44 27***
Total 31 24 29*** 60 50 20***
(i)Values are in thousands of US$ 2000 prices. Labour productivity is calculated as (EBIT plus costs of
employees) / number of employees.
(ii) % difference is calculated as follows: (MNCs’ productivity - domestics’ productivity)/domestics’
productivity.
(iii)*** 1% significance level and ** 5% significance level for a mean-comparison t-test where H0:
mean(MNCs)-mean(domestics)= 0 and Ha: mean(MNCs)-mean(domestics)> 0.
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Table 5: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MNC dummy * corporate tax rate -1.034*** -1.088*** -1.023*** -0.798***
(0.210) (0.232) (0.208) (0.240)
Company fixed effects X X X X
(Country*year) fixed effects X X X X
Observations 85,606 52,692 84,306 39,991
Number of companies 16,022 10,041 15,824 5,713
R-squared 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.00
(i) Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the company level. Model esti-
mated using within-groups estimator.
(ii) Dependent variable: TFP as defined in equation (3). In all columns, except for
column (2), value added is defined as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) plus
costs of employees. In column (2), value added is defined as sales minus costs of
materials. In all columns, except for column (3), capital is measured as fixed assets.
In column (3), capital is measured as tangible fixed assets.
(iii) Column (4) reports results for a balanced panel where each firm has seven years
of data. The Czech Republic drops out of this sample.
(iv) ∗ ∗ ∗ significant at 1%. ∗∗ significant at 5%. ∗ significant at 10%.
Table 6: Results by Country
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FR, IT, BE, France Italy Belgium Czech Rep Poland All except
CZ & PL CZ & PL
MNC dummy * corporate tax rate -1.075*** -0.684*** -1.698*** -0.228 -4.873*** -2.866*** -0.622***
(0.213) (0.243) (0.754) (0.346) (2.406) (0.821) (0.193)
Company fixed effects X X X X X X X
(Country*year) fixed effects X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 33,185 14,483 11,442 5,006 596 1,658 83,352
Number of companies 6,242 2,815 2,089 867 121 350 15,551
R-squared 0.10 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.38 0.00
(i)Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at company level. Model estimated using a within-groups estimator.
(ii) Dependent variable: TFP as defined in equation (3). Value added is defined as EBIT plus costs of employees. Capital
is measured as the book value of fixed assets.
(iii) In column (1), the sample contains five countries which have substantially reduced their corporate tax rate: Belgium,
the Czech Republic, France, Italy and Poland.
(iv) In column (7), the sample includes all countries of column (1) of Table (5) except the Czech Republic and Poland.
(v) ∗ ∗ ∗ significant at 1%. ∗∗ significant at 5%. ∗ significant at 10%.
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Table 7: Variations of the Main Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MNC dummy * corporate tax rate -1.094*** -1.067*** -1.203*** -0.730*** -1.031***
(0.217) (0.228) (0.252) (0.199) (0.212)
Size dummy * corporate tax rate 0.242
(0.210)
MNC dummy * Inflation -0.012***
(0.004)
MNC dummy * GDP growth 0.001
(0.003)
MNC dummy * Unemployment rate -0.002
(0.004)
MNC dummy * EMTR 0.297
(0.328)
Company fixed effects X X X X X
(Country*year) fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 85,606 85,606 85,606 85,606 84,119
No of panel 16,022 16,022 16,022 16,068 15,753
R-squared 0.097 0.097 0.096 0.078 0.097
(i)Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at company level. Model estimated using a within-
groups estimator.
(ii) Dependent variable: TFP as defined in equation (3). Value added is defined as EBIT plus costs
of employees. Capital is measured as the book value of fixed assets.
(iii) The size dummy takes value 1 when the log(total assets) > median log(total assets). It is time
invariant.
(iv) In column (4), αK is different for multinational and domestic firms.
(v) In column (5), the sample excludes companies which have undergone an M&A operation during
the sample period.
(vi) ∗ ∗ ∗ significant at 1%. ∗∗ significant at 5%. ∗ significant at 10%.
Table 8: Production Function Estimation
(1) (2)
MNC dummy * corporate tax rate -1.009*** -0.879***
(0.217) (0.201)
Log(fixed assets / employees) 0.139*** 0.435***
(0.007) (0.013)
Log(fixed assets) -0.380***
(0.012)
(Country*year) dummies X X
Company fixed effects X X
Observations 85,606 85,606
Number of companies 16,022 16,022
R-squared 0.04 0.10
(i) Dep. variable: EBIT+wage bill
no.employees
.
(ii) Columns (1) and (2) estimated using a within-groups estimator.
(iii) Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at company level.
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Table 9: Creation of the Sample
Steps Firms Observations
Starting sample 931,324 12,107,212
Keep only unconsolidated data 809,715 10,526,295
Drop if variable requirements not met(i) 464,903 2,656,419
Drop long or short accounting periods 464,892 2,644,260
Drop accounting mistakes 462,862 2,588,187
Keep firms with known ownership status 120,243 697,303
Keep firms within the manufacturing sector 35,456 224,655
Drop if year< 1998 and year = 2005 34,876 174,094
Drop host countries with small sample sizes 29,466 154,725
Create comparable sample in terms of size 23,498 109,641
Drop outliers 21,804 94,930
Keep firms with three consecutive years of observations 16,022 85,606
(i) We drop observations with EBIT, cost of employees, fixed assets
and number of employees either missing or equal to zero. We also
drop observations with the sum of the cost of employees plus EBIT
either equal to or smaller than zero.
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Table 10: Matrix for Changing Ownership Status–Targets
After the deal
MNC Domestic
Before the deal
MNC PI; NPI(ii) PI; NPI(ii)
Domestic NPI NPI
(i) PI: possible to identify. NPI: not possible to identify without further assumptions.
(ii) These cases are identifiable with certainty only if the country of vendor is different from the country of target.
If the country is the same, we cannot decide whether the vendor was really domestic or part of an international group.
We flag these unidentifiable cases with NPI.
Table 11: Matrix for Changing Ownership Status–Acquirers
After the deal
MNC Domestic
Before the deal
MNC PI; NPI(ii) NPH
Domestic NPI PI
(i) PI: possible to identify. NPI: not possible to identify without further assumptions. NPH: not possible to happen.
(ii) These cases are identifiable with certainty only if the country of acquirer is the same as the country of target.
We flag these unidentifiable cases with NPI.
Table 12: Matrix for Changing Ownership Status–Vendors
After the deal
MNC Domestic
Before the deal
MNC PI PI; NPI(ii)
Domestic NPH NPI
(i) PI: possible to identify. NPI: not possible to identify without further assumptions. NPH: not possible to happen.
(ii) These cases are identifiable with certainty only if the country of vendor is different from the country of target.
We flag these unidentifiable cases with NPI.
Table 13: Year Distribution of Deals in ZEPHYR
Year MNCs Domestic Stand-alones Total Per cent
1998 9 3 0 12 2.87
1999 9 5 0 14 3.35
2000 11 6 2 19 4.55
2001 13 9 0 22 5.26
2002 52 56 14 122 29.19
2003 56 39 9 104 24.88
2004 71 45 9 125 29.90
Total 221 163 34 418 100
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Table 14: Country Distribution of Deals in ZEPHYR
Country MNCs Domestic groups Standalones Total Per cent
Belgium 22 17 1 40 9.57%
Czech Republic 5 0 0 5 1.20
Finland 16 10 2 28 6.70
France 20 15 4 39 9.33
Italy 16 7 5 28 6.70
Norway 11 7 2 20 4.78
Poland 2 3 3 8 1.91
Spain 16 14 14 44 10.53
Sweden 22 23 0 45 10.77
United Kingdom 91 67 3 161 38.52
Total 221 163 34 418 100
Table 15: ZEPHYR–Targets Dataset
Deals Firms Observations
M&As only 276,562
Targets in 9 countries(i) 80,504
Time: 1998-2004 42,034
Min final stake 50% 23,738
Completed deals only 21,891 NA 25,478
Drop if id missing 12,844 12,619 13,298
Time: 1998-2004(ii) 10,428 10,260 10,789
After merging with ORBIS NA 249(iii) 256
- no info on country of vendor 134 135
- MNC to MNC 24 24
- MNC to Domestic 12 12
- Domestic to MNC (iv) 38 40
- Domestic to Domestic(iv) 44 45
(i) Countries are the same as in the regression sample: Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland,
France, United Kingdom, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain, and Sweden.
(ii) Although we have already selected years in Zephyr, the download from the website is not precise.
Therefore, in STATA we have to drop some observations left before 1998 or after 2005.
(iii) The numbers below do not add up to 249 but to 252, as the same company might report the
country of the vendor in one deal and not report it in another one.
(iv) These observations were identified using the following assumption: when the country of the target and
of the vendor are the same, the target is considered as domestic before the deal.
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Table 16: ZEPHYR–Acquirers Dataset
Acquirers in Zephyr
Deals Firms Observations
M&As only 276,562
Acquirers in 9 countries(i) 78,215
Time: 1998-2004 40,913
Min final stake 50% 22,930
Completed deals only 21,541 NA 24,898
Drop if id missing 18,031 10,095 18,322
Time: 1998-2004(ii) 14,927 8,724 15,172
After merging with ORBIS NA 130 136
- no info on country of target 2 2
- MNC to MNC 42 44
- Domestic to MNC (iii) 16 17
- Domestic to Domestic 70 73
(i) Countries are the same as in the regression sample: Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland,
France, United Kingdom, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain, and Sweden.
(ii) Although we have already selected years in Zephyr, the download from the website is not precise.
Therefore, in STATA we have to drop some observations left before 1998 or after 2005.
(iii) These observations have been identified assuming that the foreign subsidiary bought in the deal
has made a domestic company become part of a multinational group. This assumption is likely
not to hold for many cases.
Table 17: ZEPHYR–Vendors Dataset
Vendors in Zephyr
Deals Firms Observations
M&As only 276,562
Vendors in 9 countries(i) 36,424
Time: 1998-2004 18,303
Min final stake 50% 10,459
Completed deals only 9,399 NA 12,701
Drop if id missing 6,824 4,781 7,837
Time: 1998-2004(ii) 5,674 4,101 4,989
After merging with ORBIS NA 32 32
- no info on country of target 0 0
- MNC to MNC 14 14
- MNC to Domestic 1 1
- Domestic to Domestic(iii) 17 17
(i) Countries are the same as in the regression sample: Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland,
France, United Kingdom, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain, and Sweden.
(ii) Although we have already selected years in Zephyr, the download from the website is not precise.
Therefore, in STATA we have to drop some observations left before 1998 or after 2005.
(iii) These observations were identified using the following assumption: when the country of the target and
of the vendor are the same, the vendor is considered as domestic before the deal.
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Table 18: Firms with at Least One Observation in ZEPHYR
Companies with information in Zephyr
as Target as Acquirer as Vendor
MNCs 213 144 59 14
(3.64%)
Domestic groups 152 83 62 16
(3.05%)
Stand-alones 33 22 9 2
(0.64%)
TOTAL 398 249 130 32
(2.49%)
(i) Percentages of entire sample in parentheses.
(ii) The last three columns do not always add up to the second one
as companies might act as target, acquirer, and vendor across years.
Table 19: Changes in Ownership–observations (number of companies)
After the deal
MNC Domestic TOTAL
Before the deal
MNC 81 (79) 13 (13) 94 (92)
Domestic 57 (54) 135 (126) 192 (180)
TOTAL 138 (133) 148 (139) 286 (272)
(i) The observations in the fourth row were identified using
the following assumption: when the country of the target and
of the vendor are the same, the firms are considered to be domestic before the deal.
42
References
Aitken, B. J. and Harrison, A.: 1999, “Do Domestic Firms Benefit from For-
eign Direct Investment? Evidence from Venezuela”, American Economic Review
89(3), 605–618.
Arnold, J. and Hussinger, K.: 2005, “Exports versus FDI in German Manufactur-
ing: Firm Performance and Participation in International Markets”, Discussion
Paper 73, ZEW–Centre for European Economic Research.
Bartelsman, E. J. and Doms, M.: 2000, “Understanding Productivity: Lessons from
Longitudinal Microdata”, Journal of Economic Literature 38(3), 569–594.
Bernard, A. B., Jensen, J. B. and Schott, P. K.: 2006, “Transfer Pricing by US-based
Multinational Firms”, Working Paper 12493, NBER.
Bureau van Dijk: 2007, “ORBIS Database 2007”.
http://www.bvdep.com/en/ORBIS.html.
Castellani, D. and Zanfei, A.: 2007, “Internationalisation, Innovation and Produc-
tivity: How Do Firms Differ in Italy?”, The World Economy 30(1), 156–176.
Caves, D., Christensen, L. and Diewert, E.: 1982, “Multilateral Comparisons of Out-
put, Input and Productivity Using Superlative Index Numbers”, The Economic
Journal 92(368), 73–86.
Clausing, A. K.: 2003, “Tax Motivated Transfer-pricing and the US Intrafirm Trade
Prices”, Journal of Public Economics 87(9-10), 2207–2233.
43
Criscuolo, C. and Martin, R.: 2009, “Multinationals and US Productivity Lead-
ership: Evidence from Great Britain”, The Review of Economics and Statistics
91(2), 263–281.
Devereux, M., Elschner, C., Endres, D., Overesch, M., Schreiber, U. and Spengel,
C.: 2008, “Project for the EU Commission. TAXUD/2005/DE/3 10.”, Technical
report, ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research.
Devereux, M. and Griffith, R.: 2003, “Evaluating Tax Policy for Location Decision”,
International Tax and Public Finance 10, 107–126.
Devereux, M. P.: 2007, “The Impact of Taxation on the Location of Capital, Firms
and Profit: A Survey of Empirical Evidence”, Working Paper 07/02, Oxford
University Centre for Business Taxation.
Doms, M. E. and Jensen, J.: 1998, “Comparing Wages, Skills, and Productivity
between Domestically and Foreign-owned Manufacturing Establishments in the
United States”, in R. E. Baldwin, R. E. Lipsey and J. Richardson (eds), Geography
and Ownership as Bases for Economic Accounting, Vol. 59, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, pp. 235–258.
European Commission: 2003, “Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 Con-
cerning the Definition of Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises”, Official
Journal of the European Commission . 2003/361/EC.
Flanagan, R. J.: 2006, Globalization and Labour Conditions, Oxford University
Press.
44
Fukao, K., Ito, K., Kwon, H. U. and Takizawa, M.: 2006, “Cross-border Acquisi-
tions and Target Firms’ Performance: Evidence from Japanese Firm-level Data”,
Working Papers 12422, NBER.
Girma, S. and Go¨rg, H.: 2007, “Multinationals’ Productivity Advantage: Scale or
Technology?”, Economic Inquiry 45(2), 350–363.
Griliches, Z. and Mairesse, J.: 1998, “Production Functions: The Search for Iden-
tification”, in S. Strom (ed.), The Ragnar Frisch Centennial Symposium, Econo-
metric Society Monograph Series, Cambridge University Press.
Huizinga, H. and Laeven, L.: 2008, “International Profit-shifting within Multi-
nationals: A Multi-country Perspective”, Journal of Public Economics 92(5-
6), 1164–1182.
Klette, T. J.: 1999, “Market Power, Scale Economies and Productivity: Estimates
from a Panel of Establishment Data”, Journal of Industrial Economics 47(4), 451–
476.
Lipsey, R. E.: 2002, “Home and Host Country Effects of FDI”, Working Papers
9293, NBER.
Mayer, T. and Ottaviano, G.: 2008, “The Happy Few: The Internationalisa-
tion of European Firms”, Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy
43(3), 135–148.
Overesch, M.: 2006, “Transfer-pricing of Intrafirm Sales as a Profit-shifting Chan-
45
nel–Evidence from German Firm Data”, Discussion Paper 84, ZEW–Centre for
European Economic Research.
Palmisano, S.: 2006, “The Globally Integrated Enterprise”, Foreign Affairs
85(3), 127–136.
Swenson, L. D.: 2001, “Tax Reforms and Evidence of Transfer Pricing”, National
Tax Journal 54(1), 7–25.
Van Biesebroeck, J.: 2008, “The Sensitivity of Productivity Estimates: Revis-
iting Three Important Debates”, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics
26(3), 311–328.
Weichenrieder, J. A.: 2009, “Profit Shifting in the EU: Evidence from Germany”,
International Tax and Public Finance 16(3), 281–297.
46
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation
Working Paper Series
WP09/20 Maffini, Giorgia and Socrates Mokkas, Profit-Shifting and Measured Pro-
ductivity of Multinational Firms
WP09/19 Devereux, Michael P., Taxing Risky Investment
WP09/18 Buettner, Thiess and Georg Wamser, Internal Debt and Multinationals’
Profit Shifting - Empirical Evidence from Firm-Level Panel Data
WP09/17 Arulampalam, Wiji, Devereux, Michael P. and Giorgia Maffini, The Direct
Incidence of Corporate Income Tax on Wages
WP09/16 Keuschnigg, Christian and Evelyn Ribi, Profit Taxation and Finance Con-
straints
WP09/15 Shaviro, Daniel N., Planning and Policy Issues raised by the Structure of
the U.S. International Tax Rules
WP09/14 Karkinsky, Tom and Nadine Riedel, Corporate Taxation and the Choice
of Patent Location within Multinational Firms
WP09/13 Koh, Hyun-Ju and Nadine Riedel, Assessing the Localization Pattern of
German Manufacturing & Service Industries - A Distance Based Approach
WP09/12 Loretz, Simon and Padraig J. Moore, Corporate Tax Competition between
Firms
WP09/11 Desai, Mihir A. and Dhammika Dharmapala, Dividend Taxes and Inter-
national Portfolio Choice
WP09/10 Devereux, Michael P. and Christian Keuschnigg, The Distorting Arm’s
Length Principle
WP09/09 de la Feria, Rita and Ben Lockwood, Opting for Opting-in? An Evaluation
of the Commission’s Proposals for Reforming VAT for Financial Services
WP09/08 Egger, Peter, Keuschnigg, Christian and Hannes Winner, Incorporation
and Taxation: Theory and Firm-level Evidence
WP09/07 Becker, Johannes and Clemens Fuest, Optimal Tax Policy when Firms
are Internationally Mobile
WP09/06 de la Feria, Rita, Place Where the Supply/Activity is Effectively Carried
Out as an Allocation Rule: VAT vs. Direct Taxation
WP09/05 Loomer, Geoffrey T., Tax Treaty Abuse: Is Canada responding effec-
tively?
WP09/04 Egger, Peter, Loretz, Simon, Pfaffermayr, Michael and Hannes Winner,
Corporate Taxation and Multinational Activity
WP09/03 Simpson, Helen, Investment abroad and adjustment at home: evidence
from UK multinational firms
WP09/02 Becker, Johannes and Clemens Fuest, EU Regional Policy and Tax Com-
petition
WP09/01 Altshuler, Rosanne and Harry Grubert, Formula Apportionment: Is it
better than the current system and are there better alternatives?
WP08/30 Davies, Ronald B. and Johannes Voget, Tax Competition in an Expanding
European Union
WP08/29 Pfaffermayr, Michael, Sto¨ckl, Matthias and Hannes Winner, Capital Struc-
ture, Corporate Taxation and Firm Age
WP08/28 Desai, Mihir A. and Dhammika Dharmapala, Taxes, Institutions and For-
eign Diversification Opportunities
WP08/27 Buettner, Thiess, Riedel, Nadine and Marco Runkel, Strategic Consoli-
dation under Formula Apportionment
WP08/26 Huizinga, Harry, Voget, Johannes and Wolf Wagner, International Taxa-
tion and Takeover Premiums in Cross-border M&As
WP08/25 Barrios, Salvador, Huizinga, Harry, Laeven, Luc and Gae¨tan Nicode`me,
International Taxation and Multinational Firm Location Decisions
WP08/24 Devereux, Michael P., Taxation of Outbound Direct Investment: Eco-
nomic Principles and Tax Policy Considerations
WP08/23 Fuest, Clemens, The European Commission´s Proposal for a Common
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base
WP08/22 de Mooij, Ruud A. and Sjef Ederveen, Corporate Tax Elasticities: A
Reader’s Guide to Empirical Findings
WP08/21 Loretz, Simon, Corporate taxation in the OECD in a wider context
WP08/20 Dharmapala, Dhammika, What Problems and Opportunities are Created
by Tax Havens?
WP08/19 Zodrow, George R., Corporate Income Taxation in Canada
WP08/18 de la Feria, Rita and Michael Walpole, Options for Taxing Financial Sup-
plies in Value Added Tax: EU VAT and Australian GST Models Com-
pared
